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Article 2

Judicial Histories and Racial Disparities:
Affirmative Action and the Myth of the “Post
Racial”
Alan A. Aja, Ph.D.1 and Daniel Bustillo2
I. Introduction
Over the last 40 years, the legal merits and parameters of
“affirmative action” policies have been challenged exhaustively from
state to federal courtrooms. In the most recent landmark case, Fisher
v. University of Texas,3 the U.S. Supreme Court declined to make a
decision, instead it continued to allow universities to consider race as
a factor in admissions to achieve diversity. However, the court also
opined that universities must prove that “available, workable raceneutral alternatives do not suffice” before considering race.4 In
addition, the court ruled – by a 7-1 margin – to send the case back to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further review to
determine if the school passed the test of “strict scrutiny,” the highest
level of judicial review.5 The ruling advances the trend towards
continued legal contestation of affirmative action policies – with The
New York Times characterizing the ruling as “simultaneously modest
and significant” and “likely to give rise to a wave of challenges to
admissions programs at colleges and universities nationwide.”6
Moreover, the ruling further symbolized the hastening away from
explicit race-based policies and towards more class-based redress, a
policy prescription gaining more steam amongst the left and right
alike.
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Contrary to popular belief, affirmative action does not refer
to a specific law or policy, nor is it designed to redress past
discrimination.7 Conceptually, affirmative action refers to a set of
positive anti-discrimination policies, stemming largely from a series
of Executive Orders, intended to include stigmatized groups in
preferred positions of society, with aims to promote institutional
desegregation.8 Empirical evidence consistently shows stigmatized
groups- in particular blacks, Latinos and women-face daily obstacles
in hiring, promotion, renting or buying, gaining access to education
and everyday economic activities.9 Although some social
desegregation has been achieved in government employment and
higher education as a result of affirmative action initiatives,10 legal
decisions concerning how affirmative action should be defined and
carried out, or implemented, has directly hindered its efficiency in
creating more equitable outcomes for currently stigmatized groups.
This article is organized in two interconnected segments.
First the historical trajectory of affirmative action policies is
documented, presenting a general chronological discussion of key
landmark legal decisions from local to national levels. The second
part of this article draws from empirical evidence to discuss the
implications of these decisions on unprivileged groups, paying
particular attention to African Americans and Latinos. In essence, we
demonstrate that in the absence of race or group-based affirmative
action policies, without measures of compliance and enforcement,
WILLIAM DARITY JR., Confronting Those Afﬁrmative Action Grumbles, in
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U.S. institutions are increasingly homogenous and segregated. We
conclude that while race-based criteria are the most effective criteria
to remedy present-day violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
(non-discrimination clause), if class is to supersede race in the
popular discourse and eventual policy implementation, “wealth” is a
far superior proxy for class over “income.”
II. 1960s: The Foundations for Affirmative Action Policies
During the heat of the civil rights movement, important legal
steps were taken to implement anti-discrimination measures in U.S.
society. In 1961, President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10925,
directing federal contractors to take “affirmative action to ensure that
applicants are treated equally without regard to race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.”11 While the order was deemed a step forward
by civil rights activists in eliminating employment discrimination, its
narrow focus on federal contracting dealt with only one of many
institutional spheres where racial discrimination was omnipresent.
Moreover, critics of the move viewed it simply as an extension of
previous ineffective presidential orders involving federal contracting
with little legal basis for enforcement12 given that it created the
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (CEEO), which only
maintained advisory power.
When the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act13 was signed, it
created the legal cornerstone for the eventual “results-based”
framework affirmative action would eventually employ. In this
historic act, racial discrimination in public places and institutions was
declared illegal, enforcement authorizations to desegregate public
schools were incepted, some standards for voting rights were
established, but more related to “affirmative action,” federal funds
could be withheld from federal contractors if there was evidence of
discrimination on the basis of color, race or national origin. As a

11
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result, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was
born. The EEOC, though incepted as a federal agency to create and
ensure a diverse workforce, in reality had a relatively small amount
of power to actually litigate.
In 1965, prominent members and sectors of the business
community began to vocally oppose attempts to fast-track
“affirmative action” like policies in U.S. law and policy. In this same
year, after a monumental speech at Howard University when
President Johnson made his now famous words calling for “equality
not just as a right but as a result,” he signed Executive Order 1124614,
requiring all firms with $50,000 or more in federal contracts, or with
50 or more employees, to take affirmative steps to increase minority
representation in the labor force. Moreover, this act was different
from previous orders and pieces of legislation because it introduced
enforcement procedures and allocated funds to the Department of
Labor to oversee its follow-through. In this order, Johnson also called
for a “good faith effort” by contractors to hire underrepresented
groups, requiring them to conduct self-audits and to create an
effective affirmative action plan. Two years later, Executive Order
1137515 was signed as an amendment to the previous order, changing
the word “creed” to “religion” and making sex discrimination illegal,
expanding rights and protections for women in facets of the growing
service sector and ensuring their inclusion in affirmative action
policies.
In the late 1960s affirmative action became more of a potent
anti-discrimination tool as several federal bodies were given
responsibility for the implementation and governance of antidiscrimination measures. In 1968, the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act)16 was signed,
prohibiting discrimination in housing operated or funded by the
federal government. The act gave powers to the Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) agency and the Office of Fair Housing and
Equal Opportunity to oversee and litigate cases of discrimination in
14
15
16

Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed Reg. 12,319, 12,935 (1965).
Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967).
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 - 3619.
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housing sales or rent, and mortgage lending. A year later, under
pressure from civil rights groups, President Nixon signed Executive
Order 1147817 further strengthening previous measures ensuring
equal opportunity for employment in the public sector, but also called
for affirmative steps in the advancement, training, and treatment of
“minority” civilian employees. The order also deemed the Civilian
Service Commission, the agency responsible for federal personnel
management, responsible for equal opportunity and affirmative
action in government employment.
Until the Department of Labor’s Philadelphia Plan,
affirmative action only extended itself to institutions that received
public funds. Expanding on previous key Executive Orders (11246,
11375), the Philadelphia Plan introduced “goals and timetables” for
the employment of minorities in federal construction projects, and
required local contractors, unions, and other organizations to sign
equal opportunity contracts involving both public and privately
funded construction.18 Not only was the introduction of affirmative
action to the private sector met with resistance (Congress nearly
considered banning it), but the Department of Labor also declared
that the plan would be implemented in other cities unless their
governing bodies came up with affirmative action plans of their own.
By the early 1970’s, the potency of affirmative action as an
anti-discrimination tool was cemented. Through a series of
presidential orders and laws, not only was the public and private
sector responsible for hiring and promoting historically and presently
stigmatized groups, but governmental bodies were also acquiring the
necessary power to ensure its implementation. It was this power,
along with the designation of specific underrepresented “groups” to
merit affirmative action’s benefits, which prompted legal challenges
toward the conceptual and practical implementation of affirmative
action initiatives. The next section highlights key court cases that
illuminate the legal beginnings of public discourse and debate over
the merits of affirmative action policies.
17

Exec. Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985(1969).
TERRY H. ANDERSEN, THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS: A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION (2004).
18
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Challenging Affirmative Action, 1970s

In the early 1970s, affirmative action policies were briefly
strengthened through key orders and legislation. By the time Revised
Order No. 4 (1972),19 which extended previous executive orders to
non-construction federal contractors was signed, President Nixon
had already implemented Executive Order 11625 (1971)20 directing
federal agencies to develop plans and goals for a national Minority
Business Enterprise (MBE) contracting program. Moreover, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 197221 was passed, an
amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,22 which gave the EEOC
full force of statutory law to enforce equal opportunity and
affirmative action in governmental hiring. It is important to note here
that this piece of legislation is deemed responsible for increasing the
number of African Americans and women employed by the public
sector.23
By now, the implementation of affirmative action in
government contracts and employment was being met with more
avid public resistance. Meanwhile, challenges seeking institutional
desegregation began to proliferate on judicial dockets. For example,
in Griggs v. Duke Power, (1971),24 the Supreme Court agreed that
aptitude tests and diploma requirements in hiring by Duke Power
repeated past discrimination practices against minorities, violating
civil rights legislation. As a result, the term “set-asides” using racial
preferences came to fruition, and more companies began to
implement race-conscious plans.

19

Revised Order No. 4, 41 C.F.R. part 60-2 (1972).
Exec. Order No. 11,625, 36 Fed. Reg. 19,967(1971).
21
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972).
22
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
23
Winfield H. Rose & Ping Ting Chia, The Impact of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 on Black Employment in the Federal Service: A
Preliminary Analysis, 83 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 245, 245-251 (1978).
24
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The Griggs v. Duke Power, (1971)25 case presented the
important link between employment and education. Despite civil
rights legislation introduced in previous decades, schools and
universities remained highly segregated. Latinos and Asians were
legally barred from attending some public schools in many states,
and women were systematically excluded from both public and
private universities and professional schools. Some of these realities
were challenged in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 26 and Adams v. Richardson, .27 In the former, a state court
found educational financing favored more affluent peoples and
discriminated against neighborhoods with low property value. The
Supreme Court accepted the case and disagreed, suggesting that the
state’s school financing system did not violate the Constitution, and
remanded back to the state of Texas for resolution. In the latter case,
a Federal Appeals Court approved a district order calling for federal
education officials to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The
court discovered that President Nixon’s Health, Education and Civil
Rights offices were allowing states to practice racial discrimination.
The decision also identified school districts that were once
desegregated by law but were still “racially distinguishable.” As a
result, cities like Baltimore were required to implement plans for
desegregation or risk a loss of federal funding.28 In 1974, Congress
passed the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (1974),29 prohibiting
states from denying educational opportunities on the basis of their
race, color, national origin or sex. However, the power to use racebased integration policies such as busing were limited as they were
met with resistance, and instead policies such as magnet schools,
transfer programs, and neutrally drawn school zones were introduced
as alternatives.

25

Id.
411 U.S. 1 (1971).
27
351 F.Supp. 636 (1973).
28
Research Frontiers at the University of Maryland, Division of Research, March
1, 2004, Vol. 3, No. 6.
29
Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 USC §§1701-1758 (1974).
26
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The aforementioned decisions epitomized one of the many
phases of affirmative action policy conceptualization and
implementation. In particular, these decisions were emblematic of a
move towards the questioning of group or race-based policies as a
means of providing equal opportunity, battling discrimination and
ensuring integration in public education. The controversy was
evident through the landmark legal cases, DeFunis v. Odegaard and
the University of Washington,),30 and Regents of University of
California v. Bakke,31 the latter having a more profound impact on
education policy and affirmative action.
In Defunis, a white pre-law student argued that the Equal
Protection Clause called for the elimination of racial barriers,
suggesting racial categories should not be created to demonstrate
how society is organized. The case was the first to introduce the term
“reverse discrimination” and to question race as a factor for
professional schools. The latter case, Bakke,32 legitimized the use of
race for university admissions when all other credentials are equal,
but disallowed the use of “set-asides” for minority applicants in their
admission policies. While recognizing the need to use race-based
policies to achieve “diversity” in a student body, it called for
educational institutions to distinguish between goals and quotas,
finding the latter unconstitutional.33
While the Supreme Court had redefined the rule of
affirmative action in higher education, it nearly contradicted itself in
the employment arena. In United Steelworkers v. Weber, the Court
upheld a Title VII challenge to affirmative action policies which
reserved half (50%) of job openings and training programs for
minorities as long as the plan did not adversely impact whites nor
prevent them from advancement. Because the plan was seen as a
temporary, or what the court called a “remedial rationale” designed

30

, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
32
Regents, 438 U.S. 265.
33
Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative
Action Debate. 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327-1346 (1986).
31
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to eliminate racial and gender imbalances of the past, it was decided
to be legally permissible.34
IV.

The Hostile 1980s – Affirmative Action in Decline

In the 1980s, key legal decisions involving affirmative action
in employment, education, and housing further changed the design
and implementation of affirmative action policy. When Ronald
Reagan was elected President, one of his first initiatives was an
update to Executive Order 1124635, a decree instituted by President
Carter consolidating the governance structure of affirmative action.
Under Carter’s order, the Department of Labor was responsible for
the enforcement of affirmative action, dealing mostly with
compliance reviews and regulatory policies. However, Reagan
quickly dismantled the previous administration’s process,
introducing new sets of regulations. For example, the previous
threshold of enforcing affirmative action to government contractors
with $50,000 or more in contracts was increased to $250,000 or
more. In addition, goals and timetables were labeled more as
“guidelines,” the need to comply was withdrawn and contractors
were given more time to report hiring progress of stigmatized groups.
Anderson36 argues effectively that the Reagan regime was the
most visibly hostile toward affirmative action, but the judicial system
was no different throughout the 1980s. In the arena of employment,
key decisions reversed past rights guaranteed under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and allowed affirmative action policies for temporary
purposes only. For instance, in Firefighter’s Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts,37 the Supreme Court’s decision delimited the power of
federal trial judges to prevent layoffs of minorities in order to
maintain their representation in an organization. In addition, it was
ruled Title VII could only provide relief to those who were actual

34

Rethinking Weber: The Business Response to Affirmative Action, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 658, 658-671 (1989).
35
Exec. Order No. 12,086, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,501 (1978).
36
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37
, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
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victims of illegal discrimination, inciting a debate brought up in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,38 over whether Title VII
allows any type of class-based, race-conscious belief to operate as
designed to remedy historical discrimination or prevent it from
occurring in the future.39 The outcome of Wards Cove v. Antonio40
temporarily squashed the debate, when the Supreme Court held 5-4
that statistical evidence of racial or gender inequalities in workforce
was not sufficient alone to prove discrimination, removing the
burden of proof of discriminatory impact away from the employer
and onto the victim of discrimination (plaintiff).
On the upside, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency,41 the
Supreme Court upheld a plan that authorized the consideration of
gender in promotion decisions, but once again allowed affirmative
action based on a “remedial-rationale” of the policy. However, in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosson Construction Company, 42 deemed
one of the most significant civil rights cases of the 1980s, the city of
Richmond’s (Virginia) affirmative action plan of setting-aside 30%
of contracts for minority contractors was struck down because it was
not “narrowly-tailored” to accomplish a remedial purpose. The
Supreme Court ruled that there must be “compelling interest” such
as to remedy past discrimination, and that the city must use “strict
scrutiny” when implementing affirmative action policies.43
Explained differently, the Supreme Court ruled that state and local
level affirmative action programs allowing claims of past
discrimination do not justify “set-aside” programs, which Justice
O’Connor argued were rigid versions of quotas.
V. The 1990s: Defending Affirmative Action

38

476 US 267 (1986).
Robert N. Roberts, The Public Law Litigation Model and Memphis vs. Stotts,
45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 4, 527-532 (1985).
40
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
41
480 U.S. 616 (1987).
42
, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
43
George R. La Noue, The Impact of Croson on Equal Protection Law and Policy.
61 ALBANY L. REV. 1, (1997).
39
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In the early 1990’s, Congress responded to some of the
previous decade’s hostile court decisions on civil rights. In the Civil
Rights Act of 1991,44 which amended the 1964 landmark law,
Congress overruled the Supreme Court decisions (primarily Wards
Cove v. Atonio,)45 by re-placing the burden on employers to ensure
and prove that they were not practicing discrimination against
stigmatized groups. It also re-allowed women and under-represented
groups to call for damages in cases of intentional discrimination in
the workplace, strengthening their civil rights protections.
A year later, the need for affirmative action in housing was
reaffirmed in NAACP Boston Chapter v. Kemp..46 In that district
case, all Boston-area HUD affirmative fair housing marketing plans
were ruled to have failed in their “statutory mandate” to represent the
racial composition of the city as a whole. As a result, the consent
decree triggered affirmative action goals in similar urban contexts,
requiring cooperation for dispersal of assisted housing in 137 cities
and towns nation-wide.
In 1993, one of President Clinton’s first decisions upon his
election was an update to Executive Order 11246,47 signing the
toughest affirmative action decree known to date. The Order focused
on the worst offenders of minority hiring and procurement, primarily
the construction trades, and called for more aggressive actions
including “debarment” of contracting licenses for contractors acting
in non-compliance. Two years later, opponents of affirmative action
went on the offensive, and federal hiring programs were once again
debated in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Frederico Pena.48 In this
case, the Supreme Court made a nearly identical ruling as in
Crosson,49 but this time restricted the use of affirmative action
policies in federal highway construction contracts. According to the
Court’s majority, race-based preferential government policies,

44
45
46
47
48
49

Civil Rights Act 1991, H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st session (1991).
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
721 F. Supp. 361 (1989).
Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed.Reg. 12,319, 12,935(1965).
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosson Constr. Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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specifically those targeting disadvantaged groups, must receive the
highest level of scrutiny. Moreover, the government would have to
tailor preferential policies toward past discrimination, but not
everyday grievances.
The Adarand50 decision represented a major setback for
affirmative action, and both President Clinton and Congress followed
with subsequent decisions responding to pressure for reform. In July
of 1995, while defending the need for affirmative action as a means
toward alleviating institutional desegregation, President Clinton
signed a memorandum calling for the elimination of any program that
involved quotas, preferences for unqualified individuals, that
“reverse discriminates” or continues as policy after equal
opportunity has been achieved. Affirmative action was still alive, but
in a limited form. The memorandum was followed by the approval
of the Equal Opportunity Act (1995),51 not just prohibiting
discrimination in federal employment hiring on the basis of an
individual’s race, sex, national origin or color, but also prohibiting
any form of preferential treatment in hiring practices.
Amidst the controversies of affirmative action policies in the
federal employment arena, race-based policies in higher education
were also legally challenged. In 1995, the Board of Regents of the
University of California voted to remove race/ethnicity, religion,
color, or national origin as a consideration in admissions, contracting
or hiring in the state higher education system. A year later in
Hopwood v. University of Texas Law School, ,52 a federal court ruled
that admissions procedures illegally discriminated against white
applicants, banning separate admissions and financial aid based on a
person’s race or ethnicity. This decision challenged the historic
Bakke53 decision, which rejected quotas but argued race could be
used as a factor for university admissions. Moreover, in Hopwood 54

50
51
52
53
54

Adarand, 515 U.S. 200.
Equal Opportunity Act of 1995, S.1085, 104th Cong (1995).
78 F.3d 932, 948 (1996).
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948.
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“diversity” as a goal in intellectual institutions was not of
“compelling interest” to the state.
As the new millennium approached, affirmative action, as a
general set of institutional desegregation policies, was clearly in
decline. After Proposition 209,55 a law banning all forms of
affirmative action in public employment, public education or public
contracting, was passed in California in 1997, subsequent states
followed with laws mirroring the decision. Washington State enacted
Initiative 200 and Florida banned race as a factor in college
admissions in 2000. Taken together, this represented a movement
away from an explicit acknowledgement that racism and
discrimination persist towards an internalization of the “post-racial,”
the unwarranted belief that America has largely transcended its racial
divide.
VI.

Revitalization or Last Breath? The New Millennium

In 2000 a federal judge ruled that the use of race as a factor
for admissions at the University of Michigan was constitutional.56
The university argued, and the judge agreed, that if legacies, athletes
and other groups deemed beneficial to the university were given
preferential treatment, so too could “minority” (read: blacks,
Latinos) groups be seen as contributing to a diverse intellectual
student body. In a separate challenge to the university’s law school
admissions criteria, a judge saw no relationship between racial
diversity and intellectual diversity. The case was reversed on appeal
a year later, re-igniting nearly 30 years of judicial contradictions and
interpretations surrounding affirmative action’s legal validity.57
After the Board of Regents of the University of California
took back some of their 1997 decisions in 2001, reinstating some
affirmative action policies in the university system hiring and
admissions policies, the Supreme Court also partially revived and
redefined the policy. Agreeing to hear the aforementioned University
55
56
57

California Civil Rights Initiative, Prop. 209 (1996).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (2001).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (2002).
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of Michigan cases in 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a
“compelling interest” to acquire education and training in a diverse
student body. While disallowing a system used by the undergraduate
institution that gave additional points for admission based on an
individual’s racial identification, it did allow race to be used
alongside other criteria as long as there was no strong emphasis on
it. Moreover, the law school was allowed to admit a “critical mass”
of minority students in order to ensure a heterogeneous student body,
declaring the value of diversity in public institutions.
In 2007, divisions within the U.S. Supreme Court continued
to manifest themselves in contradictory opinions, with the cases of
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1 and Meredith v. Jefferson County, as the battlegrounds58. In
these cases the courts ruled that public school systems could not seek
to achieve or maintain integration through measures that take explicit
account of a student’s race. 59. These rulings invalidated programs in
Seattle, WA and metropolitan Louisville, KY that sought to maintain
school-by-school diversity by limiting transfers on the basis of race
or using race as a “tiebreaker” for admission to particular schools.60
Importantly, both programs had been upheld by lower federal courts
and were similar to plans in place in hundreds of school districts
around the country. However, in a separate opinion on Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle, Justice Anthony Kennedy
wrote that achieving racial diversity, “avoiding racial isolation,” and
addressing “the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling” were
“compelling interests” that a school district could constitutionally
pursue as long as it did so through programs that were sufficiently
“narrowly tailored.”61 The opinion produced by Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle case contained the infamous and
simplistic statement by Chief Justice John Roberts that, “the way to

58
59
60
61

551 U.S. 701 (2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race.”62
Most recently, in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the
Supreme Court – by a 7-1 margin – ruled that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted precedent and should reevaluate the case of plaintiff Abigail Fisher, who claimed that the
university unconstitutionally discriminated against her.63 While not
outlawing affirmative action programs, the Court continued to
reinforce the notion that such programs must meet a test known as
“strict scrutiny.” The opinion provided by Justice Kennedy indicates
that a university’s use of affirmative action will be constitutional only
if it is “narrowly tailored”and an indispensable component of
achieving diversity.64 Accordingly, the practical implications of this
decision indicate that courts will need to ascertain and determine that
the use of race as a component of admission decisions is indeed
“necessary.”65
Despite the unpredictability of how states will interpret the
Fisher ruling, at present, the future of race-based affirmative action
remains uncertain. Thus, how far, or to what extent, can affirmative
action go to achieve goals of equal opportunity, integration and
diversity in employment, education, housing and all aspects of public
life given the constant legal redefinition of its parameters? An
examination of the empirical evidence from various spheres in which
affirmative action has been employed as an anti-discrimination tool
and a look at the prevailing sentiments impacting opinions pertaining
to affirmative action policies are starting points in addressing this
question.
VII.

62
63
64
65

Post-Racialism and the Conundrum of Persistent
Disparities

Id.
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411(2013)
Id. at 2418
Id. at 2419.
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In an era that renders positive anti-discrimination measures
as unnecessary, a position undoubtedly contradictory considering the
aforementioned (and discussed below) empirical evidence that yields
otherwise, this section addresses the propagation that the Civil Rights
movement was successful and that we’ve entered an era of raceneutrality or “color-blindness,” where race is viewed as a thing of the
past. We begin, for example, with a July 2013 Gallup poll that
indicated two-thirds of Americans were found to believe that college
applicants should be admitted solely based on merit, with only 28%
believing an applicant’s racial and ethnic background should be
taken into account to promote diversity on college campuses.
According to the poll a full three-quarters of white Americans believe
that college admissions should be solely based on merit. Conversely,
the very same poll finds that a majority of Americans – 58%—still
support affirmative action programs more generally.66
The meritocratic underpinnings and color-blind centrality of
the above poll are key in understanding how the perception of “postracialism” is hostile to structures, policies and alternative narratives
which attempt to bring to light and ameliorate persistent racial
disparities. To explain, we turn to economists Darrick Hamilton and
William Darity, Jr. (2010),67 who describe the propagation of postracialism as a shift from an acknowledgement of some form of
societal social responsibility for the condition of black America to a
more overt position and ethic of individual personal responsibility.
This rhetoric posits that discrimination and other social barriers are
largely of a by-gone era, and that blacks must cease playing the
‘victim role’.”68 The authors note that the post-racial narrative often
acknowledges the existence of racial discrimination; however, it
conversely makes the process of redress for specific oppressed
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groups more difficult due to a “rising tide lifts all boats” mentality.69
In addition, what seems to be missing from the post-racial narrative
is an explicit acknowledgement of the overwhelming preponderance
of empirical evidence that indicates the measure of inequality.
In a recent reflection of the present state of race relations in
the United States, long-time race and inequality scholar Lawrence
Bobo provides three potential definitions of post-racialism, which he
refers to as laissez-faire racism.70 According to the author, in the
post-racial era, a new pattern of attitudes and beliefs have emerged,
leading to a more covert, sophisticated, culture-centered, and subtle
racist ideology, qualitatively less extreme and more socially
permeable than Jim Crow racism.71 Bobo frames the perniciousness
of the narrative by asking, “In an era of widespread talk of having
achieved the post-racial society, do we have real evidence that
attention to and meaning of basic race categories are fundamentally
breaking down?”72
Turning to an examination of the empirical evidence on the
veracity of having achieved a post-racial society, we can answer that
it is in short supply. As an example, while the face of poverty remains
societally stigmatized as a person of color, the evidence shows this
stigmatization to be false. According to recent (2013) figures
calculated by the Census Bureau, two-thirds of those below the
poverty line identify as white.73 Moreover, while proportionally
poverty rates for blacks and Latinos are nearly three times higher than
that of whites, the overwhelmingly predominant face of the poor is
white. More than 19 million whites fall below the poverty line for a
family of four, a figure nearly double the number of poor blacks..74
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In the realm of employment, the latest figures provided by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics note that the overall black unemployment
rate was estimated at 12.9% and at 9% for Latinos, compared to 6.3%
for whites and an overall national rate of 7.2%.75 The figures from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics for 2012—broken down by
educational attainment—present a starker underscoring of the
reality.76 For instance, in 2012 the unemployment rate for whites with
less than a high school diploma was 11.4%, but for black Americans
with less than a high school diploma the rate was estimated at 20.4%.
The unemployment rate in 2012 for whites with a bachelor’s degree
or higher was 3.7%, but for black Americans it stood at 6.3%.77 These
trends are well rooted in a historical context as the overall
unemployment rate for black Americans has always been roughly
double that of whites and for Latinos roughly one and a half times
that of whites.78 Research has also demonstrated that even after
taking educational attainment into account, black men are
overrepresented or “crowded into” low-wage jobs and
underrepresented or “crowded out” of high-wage jobs, determining
that the most likely explanation is labor market discrimination.
Large racial disparities in income and wealth also persist. In
1940, when the U.S. decennial census began collecting wage and
earnings data by race, the typical black male earned less than 45
percent of what the typical white male earned, and by 1980 the
earnings gap fell to a little over 70 percent where it has more or less
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remained.79 At the household level, median adjusted household
income for blacks is now 59.2% that of whites, up slightly from
55.3% in 1967.80 Moreover, white families possess substantially
more wealth than black and Latino families.81 Prior to the 2007 Great
Recession, data from the 2005 Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) revealed a white household median net worth of
approximately $135,000 and a black household median net worth of
a little over $12,000.82 Thus, the typical black family had less than 9
cents for every dollar in wealth of the typical white family. After the
Great Recession, this gap nearly doubled with the typical black and
Latino family having about a nickel for every dollar in wealth held
by the typical white family, with the typical black household having
$5,677 in net worth and the typical Latino household $6,325.83 A
more recent report from the Institute on Assets and Social Policy at
Brandeis University84 indicates that the wealth gap almost tripled
from 1984 to 2009, increasing from $85,000 to $236,500 with the
median net worth of white households in the study growing to
$265,000 over the 25-year period compared with just $28,500 for
black households.85 Data from the Survey of Consumer Finances has
also been used to demonstrate that in 2010, whites on average had
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six times the wealth of blacks and Latinos.86 In fact, after adjusting
for inflation, the median net worth for black households in 2011
($6,446) was lower than it was in 1984 ($7,150), while white
households’ net worth was almost 11% higher.87Taking all of the
aforementioned into account, what is absolutely clear from the
empirical evidence is that the racial wealth gap exceeds $100,000 and
is expanding.
With the aforementioned socioeconomic racial disparities as
sober frames, the question then becomes what has been the effect of
attempts to address these persistent disparities through affirmative
action measures? This section addresses the practical implications of
affirmative action policies, drawing from scholarly studies that
measure progress of institutional desegregation. Problems with this
type of analysis are two-fold; First, because affirmative action is not
one coherent policy, but rather redefined over the last 50 years
through a series of executive and administrative orders and judicial
decisions, deciphering any impact depends on what Anderson has
called the “ebb and flow” surrounding the implementation of the
policy.88 Second, affirmative action has been carried out in housing,
employment, higher education and other spheres where the inclusion
of underrepresented groups is the mission, making for a difficult
general assessment. However, as this section will underscore, there
is ample evidence that overall, decisions by state and federal courts
on affirmative action have almost immediate impacts on the extent
of desegregating US institutions. Moreover, research shows that in
the absence of measures of compliance, violations of Title VII
continue to persist.
***
Researchers first began to assess the impact of affirmative
action policies in the 1970s. In the early years of affirmative action,
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it was found that upon initial enforcement, black male employment
among federal contractors was more abundant in clerical and
operative occupations, but less so in management jobs.89 Rose and
Chia 90 drew similar conclusions, questioning the impact of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,91 the law giving statutory
validity to affirmative action measures in the governmental
employment arena.92 Using numerical data provided by the Civil
Service Commission in 1974, initial assessment of minority-hiring
progress was disappointing. The authors found too few blacks in
higher-level governmental agency positions and too many in lowerlevel positions.93 The reasons, the authors suggest, point to the
context of the times; affirmative action was still young, and working
in government was seen as a last resort of unemployment given its
long-standing history of hostility toward African Americans.94
A few years later Clynch and Gaudin focused on the
integration of women in the workforce and drew similar conclusions
about the public sector, but found some progress in the private
sphere. Prior to this study, no scholars had made a comparative
analysis of affirmative action’s implications in both the private and
public sectors.95 Examining female/male employment patterns in
private and naval Maritime shipyard jobs (occupations traditionally
held by men), female employment increased by 4% in private
shipyards, but only 0.5% in government facilities.96 The authors gave
a plausible explanation: while increase in female employment was
not dramatic in either setting, the slight progress in the private sector
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may have been due to the governance structure of affirmative
action.97 Private companies, looking to acquire contracts from the
government, needed to abide by affirmative action requirements or
risk losing them.98 Monitoring government agencies, on the other
hand, required more time and resources due to their bureaucratic
components. 99
The aforementioned study, along with the work of Goldstein
and Smith100 and Heckman and Wolpin,101 make general assessments
about the impact of affirmative action on employment in its early
stages: the representation of women and African Americans in
employment sectors was beginning to increase, but they were overrepresented in lower-level occupations. Leonard challenged these
assessments and painted a contradictory picture for the late 1970s.102
The author agreed that the presence of blacks and women had indeed
grown among federal and non-federal contractors, but also found an
increase in demand for stigmatized groups in higher-skilled jobs.103
The author points to the vigorous enforcement of affirmative action
during this time period, suggesting progress had come when
government intervention was stronger.104
While affirmative action matured as a policy in the late
1970s, with positive consequences for women, Latinos, African
Americans, Asians and other stigmatized groups, the hostility toward
affirmative action during the Reagan regime marked significant
declines for above groups in both public and private employment.
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Carlson’s robust intra-occupational review of U.S. Census data
makes this clear, illustrating that race/sex occupational inequality
declined significantly from the 1960s to 1970s, but from 1980 to
1989 increased dramatically.105 Leonard also makes similar
observations, pointing to a lack of enforcement by government
agencies under the Reagan years as important factor in institutional
desegregation.106
By the early 1990s, Reagan’s attempt to weaken and
dismantle affirmative action extended into Bush Sr.’s tenure, with
evidential effects on stigmatized groups during these years. For
example, studies by the GAO 107 and the Fair Employment Council
of Washington (1993)108 found significant discrimination against
designated minority groups in the employment sector, primarily
African Americans and Latinos. The former study found that Latinos
were offered 25% fewer job interviews than whites, and received
34% fewer jobs than whites.109 The latter report, consisting of a series
of tests undertaken over two years, found that blacks (24%) and
Latinos (22%) were treated significantly worse than whites while
searching for employment (despite equal qualifications).110 An
Urban Institute111 report made similar findings in the housing arena,
with both equally qualified Black and Hispanic testers experiencing
discrimination 50% of the time in their negotiations with real estate
agencies, compared to 20% for whites.
Upon incremental rejuvenation of affirmative action during
the early 1990s and into the Clinton era, a White House Staff Report
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to the President112 hailed the necessity of affirmative action policies,
illustrating the positive impact of anti-discrimination legislation in
improving minority representation in education along with federal
and private employment and earnings.113 The report cited that not
only did the quantity and quality of education for black workers
improve their earnings by 20% (overall) since the 1960s, the growth
of women in professional schools also coincided with increased antidiscrimination measures.114
While the White House staff did question why earnings gaps
still existed between blacks and whites and males and females, and
also admitted that progress had been stifled during the 1980s, the
authors vehemently defended the need for affirmative action.115
However, by the late 1990s, attacks on affirmative action began to
resurface in U.S. courtrooms. The decision to disallow race as a
factor in admissions in Hopwood v. University of Texas Law
School116 not only adversely affected minority enrollment in the state
of Texas, but also impacted other states in the Fifth Circuit where the
ruling was made.
In a study by the Civil Rights Project at Harvard
University,117 the dismantling of affirmative action in higher
education was found to have almost immediate effects. Upon
approval of Proposition 209118 in California, the landmark act
prohibiting the use of race, ethnicity, sex or national origin in public
education (including employment and contracting), the authors found
evidence of an overall decline in minority enrollment in state
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universities in a short amount of time.119 For example at UCBerkeley and UCLA respectively, Latino enrollment dropped from
14.5% to 7% and 15.8% to 11% in one academic year (19971998).120 In academic hiring, the number of women faculty fell 22
percent throughout the state.121
Finally, in examining the overall state of the evidence
pertaining to affirmative action, Holzer and Neumark122 determined
that affirmative action had a significant redistribution effect coupled
with relatively small economic efficiency consequences, which
indicates low levels of “waste” or deviation from an optimal
allocation of resources.123 In addition, Holzer and Neumark124 also
determined that affirmative action improved opportunities and
outcomes for its beneficiaries, while also generating positive external
benefits to others.125 Crucially, they also determined that the costs
borne by whites, in terms of lost jobs or lost positions at elite colleges
and universities, and the costs borne by employers had been limited.
VIII. Moving Forward - Defending and Expanding
Affirmative Action
Despite evidence of both continued inequities based on race
and the effectiveness of affirmative action as an anti-discrimination
policy and means of institutional desegregation, the societal assault
on affirmative action as a policy remedy continues. Citizens of all
stripes, including post-racial liberals, have engaged in the dichotomy
of passive and active formation of a coalition designed to deconstruct
a policy that is deemed threatening to the dominant power structure.
This threat is contained in its very existence, which forces the society
119
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adopting it to acknowledge the reality and persistence of systemic
racism and not simply as some abstract historical notion, an
admission which may be the biggest source of “grumbling” against
affirmative action.126 From a political perspective, Democrats and
Republicans have implemented a tacit agreement not to speak about
race. When was the last time affqirmative action was mentioned by
either party? As illustrated above, there is ample empirical evidence
to indicate that affirmative action works and therein, shall we say,
lies the rub.
The central question surrounding race-based affirmative
action continues to be ignored on a persistent basis: Has structural
racism/inequality diminished to such an extent that policy
prescriptions such as race or group-based affirmative action are no
longer needed? There are reasons (wealth gaps, employment gaps,
persistent mass incarceration and on and on) to conclude that the
answer is a resounding no.127 Unfortunately, privileged power
structures in American society are unwilling to engage in the process
of overcoming the mental mythology of a zero sum game, where
affirmative action policies are viewed as insidious plots designed to
tear down all the good work done by privileged folks over the years.
With this in mind, we borrow from john a. powell128 who
provides a useful frame in turning away from the effects of postracialism or what he terms “false universalism” and turning instead
towards a policy of “targeted universalism.”129 The author asks,
“How are we to understand racial conditions in society, and what is
the proper role of public policy and law for addressing or avoiding
racial questions?” in an attempt to move away from what he sees has
become an overly individualistic approach to race, racism and
racialization.130 Addressing the issue of post-racialism, he further
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states that, “[t]he post-racialists see the civil rights activists and the
explicit racists as locked in a struggle that has already been won”131
A consequence of this turn towards post-racialism and raceblindness or neutrality in the design of policy and programs, powell
effectively argues, is that this false universalism will not serve to
address the needs of marginalized groups but instead will most likely
exacerbate existing inequalities.132 Accordingly, false universalism
fails to address the situational differences of varied groups of people
in relation to institutional and policy dynamics.133 As an alternative,
powell calls for engaging in the work to ensure that our institutions
do the work we want them to do by adopting strategies that are both
targeted and universal.134 A targeted universal strategy is one that
while inclusive of the needs of both the dominant and the marginal
groups, pays particular attention to that of the marginal group.135
Whether categorized as six affirmative action grumbles136 or
nine nifty arguments against affirmative action,137 attempts at
nullifying affirmative action policies have continued unabated. For
example, it is increasingly argued that if affirmative action is to
survive in higher education, a preferred form is to substitute family
income for race as a fairer criterion for selective college
admissions.138 Undoubtedly, class and race-based affirmative action
policies are not mutually exclusive and both could contribute to the
effective desegregation of universities, but race-based affirmative
action is specifically designed to combat persistent racial
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discrimination while class-based policies are not.139 Ideally, the two
approaches should serve as complementary, non-mutually exclusive,
desegregation and anti-discriminatory tools.140 Solely class-based
affirmative action will not be effective in reaching sites of
discrimination, if discrimination occurs on the basis of race, and it
cannot replicate that which can be accomplished by race-based
affirmative action141.
Despite the relatively mixed signals provided by the U.S.
Supreme Court during the past decade, to ensure that preferred
positions of society include presently stigmatized groups is becoming
increasingly difficult. Despite the compelling empirical evidence that
demonstrate that in the absence of strict group or race-based
affirmative action policies, institutions are more socially segregated
and increasingly racially and ethnically homogenous, we are instead
moving toward systematically violating both the spirit and practical
implementation of the monumental Civil Rights Act of 1964. As
Justice Sotomayor stated in response to the prevailing view of the
court in the Fisher case, “the way to stop the discrimination on the
basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race,
and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate
effects of centuries of racial discrimination.” Given those
“unfortunate effects,” we conclude that when government
intervention is stronger, and measures of compliance and
enforcement are set in place, affirmative action policies can be
effective tools toward desegregating relatively elite positions of
society and deterring marketplace discrimination.
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